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Abstract 
What brain mechanisms underlie autism and how do they give rise to autistic behavioral 
symptoms? This article describes a neural model, called the iSTART model, which proposes 
how cognitive, emotional, timing, and motor processes may interact together to create and 
perpetuate autistic symptoms. These model processes were originally developed to explain data 
concerning how the brain controls normal behaviors. The iSTART model shows how autistic 
behavioral symptoms may arise from prescribed breakdowns in these brain processes. 
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Introduction 
Autism is a complex developmental disorder of pervasively distorted development. Social and 
communication abilities are especially affected. No single scientific perspective has provided a 
solid understanding of autism. Molecular genetics, neurochemistry, neuropathology, 
embryology, neurophysiology, and various different schools of psychological analysis have all 
contributed significantly to understanding of this disorder, but the most progress has occulTed 
integrating across multidisciplinary contexts. 
This article describes a neural network model, called the Imbalanced START (iSTART) model, 
whose properties clarify possible brain mechanisms of autism and how they give rise to autistic 
behavioral symptoms. The model includes interactions between cognitive, emotional, timing, and 
motor mechanisms, and is consistent with convergent data from a variety of disciplines that 
implicates early onset dysfunction of the cerebellar and limbic systems in autism as an initiator 
of brain dysfunction. The START (Spectrally Timed Adaptive Resonance Theory) model of 
normal cognitive-emotional behavior was derived over a period of years to explain many data 
about the brain mechanisms that control normal cognitive, emotional, timing, and motor 
behaviors (Grossberg, l972a, 1972b, 1980, 1982a, 1982b, 1984a, 1984b, 1987, 2000b; 
Grossberg and Levine, 1987; Grossberg and Merrill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 
1987, 1989). The iSTART model clarifies how autism may arise from prescribed breakdowns in 
these mechanisms. The model hereby provides a unifying interdisciplinary perspective that links 
normal to autistic behaviors, and embodies a number of predictions about autistic mechanisms 
which may help to integrate research from diverse fields. The article first reviews data about 
autism before describing how the model attempts to explain them. 
Key Features of Autism 
Autism manifests during the first three years of life. The core features of autism (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) arc qualitatively impaired socialization, impaired verbal and 
nonverbal communication, and restricted and repetitive patterns of behavior. Autistic children 
are impaired in at least one or more of: social interaction; language as used in social 
communication; and symbolic or imaginative play. Some autistics are mentally retarded, but it 
would be more precise to describe the disorder as being characterized as deviancies of 
development to a greater extent than of delays. 
The first manifestation of autism is often a failure to develop basic imitation skills. Normal 
children usually show basic imitative behaviors by the end of the first year, and are imitating 
actions like wiping a table by fifteen months. Not so most autistics. The normal ability to 
adaptively mirror the actions of others is significantly impaired. 
The communication deficits of autism often have onset before spoken language typically begins. 
Preverbal communication by way of gestures, sounds, and expressions are deficient. An autistic 
baby is, for example, unlikely to reach his arms in the air to express a desire to be picked up, and 
is unlikely to point to objects that he wants. Other communication deficits follow and are not 
mere delays of the normal pattern of development, but are instead wide-ranging and complex 
disorders (Filipek et al., 2000). Some autistics remain mute; others have agrammatism. 
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Autistics have deficits in understanding communication within social situations and language 
pragmatics is often disturbed. Then usual turn-taking of conversational language is disturbed. 
Inappropriate and idiosyncratic word usages, such as inappropriate generalizations of meaning 
and odd analogies, are common. A complete phrase from a videotape may always be quoted 
verbatim instead of a simple "no." Often, individual words may be used with hyperspecificity 
and without ever being able to apply the word to a more general concept. Prosody (tone of voice) 
is commonly "off', sometimes flat, sometimes sing-song. Echolalia is not uncommon and 
consists of echoing back what they have heard, sometimes immediately, and sometimes after 
significant delays. Hyperlexia, often included as an autistic spectrum disorder, is a disorder in 
which reading skills are extremely precocious but with little comprehension and otherwise with 
severely deficient verbal language and social skills (Kupperman, Bligh, and Barowski). 
Extreme unevenness in cognitive skills is typical among autistics. In general, the cognitive 
pattern in autistics is notable for having significantly higher performance IQ than verbal IQ. 
Many autistics have "islands" of normal or superior ability and a few autistics have narrow skill 
sets that are so vastly superior to normal populations that they are referred to as "savants". These 
areas of higher ability often include mathematical and musical skills. 
The autistic cognitive style is also notable for its extreme concreteness and hypervigilance. This 
can present by eighteen months as a lack of imaginary play. A typical toddler will pretend to talk 
on a toy phone, creating a fantasy of talking to Grandma, or Mommy at work, for example. The 
autistic toddler will instead attend to specific features of the toy, such as the dial, or the cord. 
Rather than engaging in imaginary play, he is more likely to either drop the toy quickly or to 
tenaciously perseverate on one of these specific features. He is unlikely to play the "what if' 
game: what if this was a real phone; what if my toy bear was real; what if I was Daddy? He is 
more likely to repetitively spin the wheels of a toy truck than to pretend to build a road. 
Moreover, a favorite object must be exactly right (i.e., how it was when he first noticed it) and is 
often played with according to a very specific and exact routine. They learn in a hyperspecific 
manner, without the typical formation of more abstract categories and the flexible thought that 
abstraction allows. If an autistic child learns that a particular object in his environment is a "red 
chair", he is likely to apply those words to that object only as "redchair". He is unlikely to 
appropriately generalize either "red" or "chair" to other objects. At a broader behavioral level 
there is a "need for sameness" in many situations and behavioral decompensation often occurs in 
response to even minor variations in routines. It is as if each situation is learned as a complete 
specific whole and any variation from that standard invalidates any understanding that they have 
of the situation and what to expect. 
Attentional differences are often felt to be a key feature of autism. An early identifiable 
manifestation of autism is often deficient "shared" or "joint" attention (Filipek et al., 2000). 
Shared attention, which usually emerges during a normal child's first year of life, and refers to 
the ability to follow a significant other's gaze and thus to share attention in external objects with 
others, is characteristically deficient among autistics. Autistics also commonly experience 
difficulties with disengaging or shifting attention and difficulties with splitting attention between 
different objects. 
Autistic individuals are relatively less subject to visual perceptual illusions (Happe, 1996). 
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Visual illusions depend upon integration of perceptual features for their effect. In one study, 
standard visual illusions, such as Titchner circles, Muller-Lyer figures, the Kanisza tiiangle, and 
the Hering illusion, and control figures, were presented to a group of autistic children, children 
matched by verbal mental age, and children with moderate nonspecific learning difficulties. 
Autistics were less likely to make the typical enors of either control group when presented with 
visual illusions. 
Autistics also have a facilitated skill at detecting hidden, embedded figures (Jolliffe and Baron-
Cohen, 1997). In this task, a subject is asked to find a shape embedded within a drawing of an 
object such as a bicycle. Normal controls are impaired by the presence of the perceived object to 
a greater degree than are autistics. A related finding is found when autistics and normal controls 
matched for motor ability and training are both asked to copy figures, both "possible" and 
geometrically "impossible." There was no significant difference in the speed or accuracy 
between groups in the copying of "possible" objects, but normal controls took significantly 
longer to copy "impossible"figures, and there was less of this "impossibility effect" in the 
autistic group. 
Other sensory abnormalities common among autistics include hypersensitivity to, and/or 
preoccupation with, smells, touch, and noise (Filipek et al., 2000; O'Neill and Jones, 1997). In 
distinct contrast to the autistic lack of responsiveness to social stimuli, such as facial reactions 
and praise, strong apparent emotional outbursts often occur in response to such basic sensory 
stimuli, such as clothing tags, background noise, and odors. An autistic child may respond poorly 
to many stimuli that other children commonly react to, such as his name being called, but 
respond excessively to the noise of a vacuum cleaner or traffic sounds. This excessive response 
can take the form perseverative interest in these aspects of an object (e.g., closely smelling all 
objects, including people) or reacting with tantrums to low levels of stimulation, such as to 
background noise. 
Autistics are prone to have repetitive stereotypic movements, such as rocking, hand flapping, and 
head banging. They have poor motor planning and high functioning autistics tend to have 
macrographia even when controlled for educational level. 
Finally, it must be noted that the phrase "autism" is no longer used only for those individuals 
who fit Kanner's original description. It currently includes a spectrum of disorders, which differ 
mainly according to the specific type of social impairment and associated comorbidities (Bonde, 
2000; Wing, 1997). Children with Pervasive Developmental Delay (PDD) do not meet all of the 
criteria for autistic disorder but are considered part of the autistic spectrum of disorders (Filipek 
et al., 2000). 
What Brain Abnormalities Cause Autism? 
Autism has been studied in a variety of ways, and convergent lines of analysis have implicated 
cerebellar and/or limbic system disturbances of likely early prenatal onset. Neocortical 
abnormalities have been identified as well, but are less consistent findings. These convergent 
lines of evidence include: cytoarchitectural abnormalities of early embryologic onset found in the 
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cerebellum and limbic areas; MRI studies documenting gross anatomic differences in the 
cerebellum of autistics and some inconsistent findings in limbic areas; distmtions of function in 
these areas as evidenced by studies showing disturbed patterns of metabolic activity; the finding 
in genome screens that many candidate genes for autism having significant expression in 
cerebellar structures and the awareness that many syndromes that commonly express an autistic 
phenotype share a pattern of cerebellar developmental distortions; studies which document that 
teratogens effecting cerebellar development commonly result in an autistic phenotype; and lesion 
studies of the cerebellum and of the limbic system that reproduce various aspects of autistic 
behavior. 
Cytoarchitectural abnormalities 
Cytoarchitectural abnormalities of cerebellar and some limbic structures structure have been 
among the most consistent pathologic findings in autism, and have been reviewed elsewhere 
(Fatemi et al., 2002; Rapin and Katzman, 1998; Trottier, Srivastava, and Walker, 1999). 
Postmortem studies show cerebellar Purkinje neuron loss in autistic cases. Neuronal size and 
branching pattern seem to be effected. The loss of cerebellar neurons was not associated with 
gliosis, supporting the contention that it is the result of an early embryonic insult. Increased 
neuron packing density has been noted in the amygdala, hippocampus, septal nucleii and 
mammillary body; the onset of these lesions is unclear. Diminished dendritic branching has been 
noted in the hippocampus. 
MRI studies 
Cerebellar and limbic structures are not only affected at a microscopic level. Multiple MRI 
studies have documented hypoplasia of the cerebellar vermis in many autistics and hyperplasia in 
a few (Saitoh and Courchesne, 1998). One study contained a fairly ideal control (Kates et al., 
1998). Seven year old monozygotic twin boys, one of whom met the strict definition of autism, 
and the other of whom was diagnosed as having a less florid autistic spectrum disorder, had brain 
MRis compared to each other and age-matched controls. The effected twin had smaller 
cerebellar vermis lobules VI and VII and decreased caudate, amygdaloidal, and hippocampal 
volumes. An MRI study of the basal ganglia in thirty-five high functioning autistics documented 
caudate enlargement (proportional to increased total brain volume). 
Other brain regions have had some, albeit less consistent, MRI findings. The parietal cortex has 
volume loss in some autistics (Courchesne, Press and Yeung-Courchesne, 1994) and, 
interestingly, frontal lobe volume increase has been noted to vary inversely with cerebellar 
vermal deficits (Carper and Courchesne, 2000). Studies of the amygdala and hippocampus have 
been inconsistent, but one study of ten high functioning autistic individuals documented 
increased amygdala volume. The same study noted smaller hippocampal volumes among 
autistics (Aylward et al., 1999; Howard et al., 2000). 
Metabolic studies 
The cytoarchitectural and MRI studies document consistent physical differences in the 
cerebellum and in some limbic structures in autistics of embryologic onset, but do not document 
that these structures function differently in that population. One way of gauging the physiologic 
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function of these areas is by imaging of metabolic activity. These studies document decreased 
and distorted metabolic activity of the cerebellum and limbic system in autistics. 
Magnetic resonance spectroscopy documented decreased cerebellar N-acetyl-aspartame (NAA) 
in the cerebellums of nine autistic children compared to five sibling controls in one study 
(Chugani et al., 1999). Twenty-seven autistics compared to ten normal controls, with a similar 
protocol, were found to have decreased NAA in both the cerebellum and the hippocampal-
amygdala region (Otsuka et al., 1999). NAA is an indicator of neuronal function and maturity. 
Asymmetric alterations of serotonin synthesis along the dentothalamocOitical pathway were 
found in autistic boys with positron emission tomography (Chugani et al., 1997): autistic boys 
were found to have unilaterally elevated serotonin synthesis in the cerebellar dentate nucleus 
with contralateral increase of serotonin synthesis in the contralateral thalamus and frontal cortex. 
This finding was the right cerebellar increase/left thalamus and frontal cortex decrease in five of 
seven cases, and reversed in the remaining two. 
Cerebellar dentate neurons receive input from Purkinje cells and are the main efferent from the 
cerebellum to the contralateral thalamus, which in turn projects to frontal cortical targets, 
including prefrontal cortex, Broca's area, and the motor cortex. In fetal development, serotonin 
contributes to neuronal development, possibly effecting synaptogenesis and neuronal 
differentiation; later it is a critical transmitter in the function of these circuit (Kwong et a!., 
2000). 
Genetic studies 
Genetic factors clearly play a significant but complex role in autism. Multiple gene loci have 
been associated with autism and more are likely to discovered as newer genomic techniques arc 
applied (Hoh and Ott, 2000; Lamb et al., 2000; Veenstra-Vanderweele, 2003). 
At this point many genes have been associated with a greater vulnerability to autism, but no 
single gene seems to be causative. The nature of gene-gene and gene-environment interactions is 
an area of active research. 
It is of note, however, that several genetic syndromes associated autism have either demonstrated 
cerebellar anomalies, or known expression of their gene products in the cerebellum in early 
development, and that genes associated with autism have products expressed in the cerebellum. 
While cerebellar expression of these autism-associated genes is a common thread, in no case is 
the cerebellum the only location in which they are expressed. 
Fragile X syndrome is frequently associated with autism (7%) and very commonly with language 
dysfunction. Cerebellar Purkinje cells show a high expression of fragile X mental retardation 
protein (FMRP) (Oostra, 1996). Most other forms of mental retardation are associated with 
fewer cortical neurons but Fragile X, like autism, often has a greater number. MRl studies of 
Fragile X brains document cerebellar vermal hypoplasia. A small post-mortem study 
documented focal cerebellar Purkinje cell loss (Sabaratnam, 2000). 
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Tuberous Sclerosis Complex (TSC) is also associated with autism. Autism and PDD are common 
in TSC: 25% and 40- 45% respectively (Smalley, 1998). Two genetic loci are responsible for 
TSC: TSCl (hamartin) and TSC2 (tuberin); of these TSC2 has been found to predominately 
localize to the cerebellum and spinal cord and particularly to the perinuclear region of the 
Purkinje cell (Geist et al., 1996). 
HOXA1 is another gene locus associated with autism. HOXA1 knockout mice have strikingly 
similar deficits to brainstem anomalies seen in some autistics and variant HOXA1 alleles in have 
been found in some human autistics (Rodier, 2000). 
Genome screens of autistic populations have identified associated cytogenetic abnormalities in 
several locations. The genomic approach presumes that genes in these regions are candidates for 
a genetic susceptibility to autism. Duplications of material from 15q region from the maternal 
chromosome, and submicroscopic genomic deletions in the same area, are among the most 
common of the chromosomal anomalies identified with autism so far. Not all studies have 
documented anomalies in this area, however. Among the candidate genes in this area are the 
genes which code for GABA-A receptor subunits. Cerebellar Purkinje cells are GABAnergic 
(Trottier et al., 1999). 
Abnormal expression of mRNA for glutamate receptor AMPA 1, excitatory amino acid 
transporter 1, and of other members of the glutamate family of genes were identified on a 
postmmtem cerebellar study (Purcell et al., 2001). The same study found decreased density of 
AMP A-type glutamate receptor density. 
Teratogens 
Genes are not alone in affecting the embryologic development of brain structures. Environmental 
factors also alter the course of development. Teratogens that influence the early embryologic 
development of hindbrain structures also provide evidence for the significance of an early 
disruption in normal cerebellar development. Teratogens known to affect the early embryologic 
development of structures derived from the basal plate of the rhombencephalon, such as the 
early-forming cranial motor nuclei and the cerebellum, are associated with autistic spectrum 
disorders. 
Children exposed prenatally to thalidomide, at and only at 20 to 24 days after conception (when 
rhombencephalon basal plate derivatives including cranial motor nuclei V, XII, V, and III 
develop and immediately preceding the period of greatest production of cerebellar Purkinje 
cells), experienced a high incidence of autism (4 - 5%) and have documented brain stem 
anomalies (Rodier et al., 1996). 
Valproate embryopathy also has a common association with autism and an animal model for this 
damage has been developed. Rats exposed to valproate on embryonic day 12.5 had brain stem 
anomalies similar to those found in human thalidomide cases and had significantly fewer 
cerebellar vermal Purkinje cells. Behavioral studies were not done (Ingram et al., 2000; Rodier et 
al., 1996). 
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Lesion Studies 
The teratogen data is, in a sense, a means of demonstrating that lesions of pertinent structures 
result in autistic behaviors, It is, however, limited in that the lesions that result from teratogens 
are not clearly isolated from any other damage. This issue is addressed by studies of isolated 
damage in both human and animal models. Features of autism result from isolated lesions to a 
variety of cerebellar and limbic structures during development. 
Amygdala lesions result in deficits of the identification of the facial expression of fear, of 
perception of eye gaze direction, and of facial recognition, similar to those measured in high 
functioning autistics (Howard et al., 2000). 
Isolated bilateral hippocampal sclerosis of early childhood onset results in behaviors and 
development very similar to autism, (DeLong and Heinz, 1997) with failure of language learning 
and learning of complex social and adaptive skills in general. 
Children who had surgical resection of posterior fossa tumors were documented to have 
impairments in executive function, including planning and sequencing, and in visual-spatial 
function, expressive language, verbal memory and modulation of affect (Levisohn et al., 2000). 
Verma! lesions were most associated with affective dysregulation, including blunted affect, and 
disinhibited and inappropriate behaviors. Another group studied were further stratified by lesion 
location. These children manifested linguistic deficits, visuospatial deficits, or autistic-like 
behaviors contingent upon the lesion location. Children who had removal of right cerebellar 
tumors manifested difficulties with auditory sequential memory and language processing. Those 
who had resections of left cerebellar tumors presented with difficulties on spatial and visual 
sequential memory. Children who had vermal tumors removed had either: an immediate mutism 
evolving into language disorders; or behavior disorders "reminiscent of autism" (Riva and 
Giorgi, 2000). 
Animal studies also confirm autistic-like behaviors after early cerebellar vermal lesions (Bobee, 
2000). Rats who were subjected to midline lesions of the cerebellum on day ten were studied as 
adults. They showed perseverative behaviors and were less affected by environmental 
distractors. 
Behavioral Studies 
Abnormalities of autistic performance occur during classical conditioning of the eye-blink 
response (Sears et al., 1994). The classically conditioned eye-blink response is one of the best 
studied example of associative learning in vertebrates and multiple studies have established that 
cerebellar and limbic areas are critical for this sort of learning in both animals and humans. The 
hippocampus also plays an important role in this response. Compared to controls, autistic 
subjects leamed the task more quickly, but performed short-latency, high-amplitude responses. 
These findings are consistent with aberrant cerebellar modulation of the timing and amplitude of 
the expression of learned motor representations to sensory inputs in autism. 
Not all eye movement data are consistent with cerebellar dysfunction, however (Minshew et al., 
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1999). Some data from a study of autistic reflexive and volitional saccades are more consistent 
with prefrontal effects. No difference was found between the autistic and the control group on 
measures of saccade metrics, while there was an increase in response suppression enors on both 
antisaccade and oculomotor delayed-response tasks. 
Other studies document motor planning deficiencies in autistics, which may be consistent with 
cerebellar dysfunction. High functioning autistics have macrographia in a study that compared 
them to controls matched by age and IQ, and when covaried with educational level (Beversdorf 
et al., 2001). Another study (Rinehart et al., 2001) used a simple motor reprogramming task to 
reveal atypical movement preparation characterized by "a lack of anticipation" in autistics. 
One study showed that visual attention deficits, including slowed covert orienting of attention, 
are similar in both adult autistics and other models of cerebellar damage (Townsend et al., 1999). 
Functional MRI studies show cerebellar activation in tasks of visual selective attention and 
attention shifting devoid of motor components. Patients with cerebellar damage from strokes or 
from tumor are slow to orient attention in space, and approach normal performance only after a 
800-1200 msec delay. This slowed orientation of attention is independent of gaze shifting 
effects. Autistic performance was comparable to patients with cerebellar damage from stroke or 
tumor. Similar slowed orienting of visual attention has been documented in children with autism 
(Harris et al., 1999) and is correlated with the degree of cerebellar hypoplasia. 
Work in motor Jcaming paradigms has shown how the cerebellum helps coordinate the timing 
and amplitude of neuronal population responses. Cerebellar-mediated adaptive timing fine-tunes 
the timing and amplitude of neuron population responses in such a way as to allow motor 
responses to become paired with sensory representations across various time spans according to 
their motivational importance. The classically conditioned eye-blink response serves as a model. 
A sensory stimulus, such as a light or tone, is previously paired with puff of air after some 
interval. This stimulus results in a neuronal population response, which is a cortical sensory 
representation. The exact timing and amplitude of a different neuronal population response, the 
motor representation, which results in the eyeblink response, is modulated by cerebellar 
mechanisms. 
Most often the classically conditioned response models the learning of associations between 
activities of neuronal populations in the sensory cortex and the motor cortex. The timing 
functions of the cerebellum appear may also be involved in processing representations in other 
brain locations as well. These representations may be part of "where" stream processing but may 
not be involved, directly, in voluntary motor functions. One documented example of a cerebellar 
mediation of a response other than within a motor cortex neuronal population is rabbit 
conditioned bradycardia (Ghelarducci and Sebastini, 1999). In this model vermal cerebellar 
lesions resulted in an increase in the amplitude of the conditioned bradycardic response when 
compared to controls. 
Testing the hypothesis of cerebellar adaptive tlmmg of nonmotoric coordinates requires 
observing and measuring some sutTogate for sensory and higher-order representations. The best 
current measure of these act!Vltres may be event related potentials (ERPs) and 
magnetoencephalograms (MEGs). ERPs measure the timing of the electrical activity in multiple 
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populations of neurons in response to various stimuli by means of scalp recorded EEGs. MEGs 
are the magnetic equivalent to an ERP and measure the magnetic field induced by the electrical 
response. ERP and MEG to date are suppottive of such an adaptive timing hypothesis. 
Two sets of ERP data investigate effects on the ERP P300, which is well studied and correlates 
with stimulus probability and task relevance. 
Patients with idiopathic late-onset cerebellar degeneration show timing abnormalities of P300 
and have demonstrated impairments in a variety of nonmotoric functions. In the study (Tachbana 
et al., 1999), 15 patients were compared to 10 age matched controls. General cognitive function 
was normal in both groups. There was no difference between the latency timing for the N 100 
(early sensory processing) but there was a significant latency delay of P300 compared to age-
matched controls. This timing difference of a sensory processing ERP was not correlated with 
motor disability, which suggested an independent effect. The generators of P300 are believed to 
include multiple cortical sites including the frontal lobe, the temporoparietal junction, and the 
medial temporal lobe, and a variety of subcortical areas. Patients in this study were felt to have 
isolated cerebellar degeneration and the P300 effects were felt to be secondary to disruption of 
cerebellar effects. 
ERP work in autistics also documents timing and amplitude anomalies of ERPs. In autistics, 
NlOO does not have the normal increase with stimulus intensity (Bruneau et al., 1999). NlOO 
amplitude increases bilaterally with increasing stimulus intensity in controls. Autistics fail to 
demonstrate this intensity effect on the left side while preserving it on the right. Also, P300 
amplitude is smaller in autistics than in controls; specifically P300 is smaller for phonetic stimuli 
at left hemisphere recording sites and not at right hemisphere sites, while no differences were 
found for musical chord stimuli at any site (Dawson et al., 1988). This result is consistent with 
the concept that adaptive timing for non-language auditory input (musical chord stimuli) is 
intact, whereas the topography of a language-related auditory stimuli (phonetic stimuli) is 
impaired. 
Finally, a case report of MEG data in an autistic man further documents timing and amplitude 
differences (Hurley et al., 2000). This case report looked at the MEG at 100 ms latency in an 
autistic 33-year-old male. The stimuli were tones presented at various interstimulus intervals 
(ISis). The right hemisphere demonstrated the normal progressive decrease in the response as IS! 
decreased. The left hemisphere response demonstrated abnormality of its amplitude response 
with the shortest IS! triggering the largest response and abnormal waveform morphology at 
longer ISis. 
iSTART: A Neural Model of How Autistic Symptoms Can Arise 
The data above summarize the case for characterizing autism as resulting from early onset 
dysfunction in parts of the limbic and/or cerebellar systems. The remainder of this article reviews 
models of how the brain gives rise to normal behaviors, and shows how these models can 
generate formal symptoms that resemble autistic behaviors when their mechanisms are 
imbalanced and/or lesioned in prescribed ways. This approach suggests how autism may arise 
from mechanisms for the control of normal behaviors, and makes predictions about how 
malfunctions of these mechanisms can give rise to autistic behaviors. 
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Figure 1. (a) The simplest CogEM model: Three types of interacting representations (sensory, drive, and motor) that 
control three types of learning (conditioned reinforcer, incentive motivational, and motor) may be used to explain 
many learning data. Sensory representations temporarily store internal representations of sensory events. Drive 
representations are sites where reinforcing and homeostatic, or drive, cues converge to activate emotional responses. 
Motor representations control the read-out of actions. Conditioned reinforcer learning (CRL) enables sensory event<; 
to activate emotional reactions at drive representations. Incentive motivational learning (IML) enables emotions to 
generate a motivational set that biases the system to process information consistent with that emotion. Motor 
learning allows sensory and cognitive representations to generate actions. In order to work well, a sensory 
representation must have (at least) two successive stages, so that sensory events cannot release actions that are 
motivationally inappropriate. These stages are interpreted as sensory cortex and prefrontal cortex representations of 
the sensory event, respectively. The prefrontal stage requires motivational support from a drive representation to be 
fully effective. The amygdala is interpreted as one important part of a drive representation. Amydgala inputs to 
prefrontal cortex cause feedback to sensory cortex that selectively amplifies and focuses attention upon 
motivationally relevant sensory events. (b) When a drive representation like the amygdala gets depressed (gray box), 
diminished activation of its outputs in response to sensory events depresses motivational inputs to the prefrontal 
cortex in response to emotionally important events, and hereby attenuates motivationally~appropriate signals to and 
from the prefrontal cortex (dashed lines). As a result, motivationally irrelevant events are not attentionally 
suppressed, and prefrontally-mediated plans and actions are insufficently activated. 
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Cognitive-Emotional Learning and Affective Depression 
The models in question explain aspects of cognitive information processing and cognitive-
emotional interactions, and how they control adaptively timed motor responses. A key theme in 
these models is that constraints on brain development and learning may greatly constrain the 
kinds of information processing that govern both normal and abnormal behaviors. One of these 
models is called a CogEM model, because it joins together Cognitive, Emotional, and Motor 
processes (Grossberg, 1982, 1984b, 2000b ); see Figure 1 a. The Co gEM model tries to explain 
how emotional centers of the brain, such as the amygdala, interact with sensory and prefrontal 
cortices-notably ventral, or orbital, prefrontal cortex-to generate affective states, attend to 
motivationally salient sensory events, and elicit motivated behaviors. Activating the feedback 
loop between cognitive and emotional centers is predicted to generate a cognitive-emotional 
resonance that can support conscious awareness. 
When such emotional centers become depressed in a particular way, formal analogs of 
schizophrenic negative symptoms emerge in the model (Grossberg, 1984a, 2000b); see Figure 
lb. One component of our explanation of autism includes the possibility of emotional 
depression, albeit a type of depression that may not occur in many schizophrenics. 
Behavior 
Arousal 
UNDERAROUSED 
DEPRESSION 
Elevated 
Threshold 
Hyperexcitable 
Above 
Threshold 
OVERAROUSED 
DEPRESSION 
Low 
Threshold 
Hypoexcitable 
Above 
Threshold 
Figure 2. Gated dipole opponent processes exhibit an Inverted-U behavioral response as a function of arousal level, 
with underaroused and overaroused depressive syndromes occurring at the two ends of the Inverted-U. See text for 
details. [Reprinted with permission from Grossberg (2000).] 
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Emotional depression arises in the model from fact that its emotional centers are organized into 
opponent affective processes, such as fear and relief. The response amplitude and sensitivity to 
external and internal inputs of these opponent-processing emotional circuits, which are called 
gated dipoles for reasons described below, are calibrated by an arousal level and chemical 
transmitters that slowly inactivate, or habituate, in an activity-dependent way. These opponent 
processes exhibit an Inverted-U whereby behavior become depressed if the arousal level is 
chosen too large or too small (Figure 2). Underaroused and overaroused depression can be 
distinguished clinically by their parametric properties, as briefly noted in Figure 2. Some 
symptoms of autism are proposed to be due to underaroused depression and the way in which 
this property interacts with other circuits, notably cognitive and motor circuits, throughout the 
brain. In particular, if the amygdala experienced underaroused depression, then this deficiency 
could ramify throughout the brain, as schematically shown in Figure lb. 
Perceptual and Cognitive Learning, Expectation, Attention, and Fantasy 
A related model suggests how brain mechanisms of peceptual and cognitive learning, attention, 
and volition work. This Adaptive Resonance theory, or ART, model (Grossberg, 1980, 1999b) 
proposes an answer to the "stability-plasticity dilemma;" namely, how the brain can learn 
quickly throughout life without being forced to forget previously learned memories just as 
quickly. ART proposes how normal learning and memory may be stabilized through the use of 
learned top-down expectations (Figure 3a). In other words, we are "intentional" beings so that 
we can learn quickly without suffering catastrophic forgetting. These expectations learn 
prototypes that are capable of focusing attention upon the combinations of features that comprise 
conscious perceptual experiences (Figure 3b). When top-down expectations are active in a 
priming situation in the absence of bottom-up information, they can modulate or sensitize their 
target cells to respond more effectively to future bottom-up information that matches the 
prototype. Such expectations cannot, however, fully activate these target cells under most 
circumstances. When bottom-up inputs do occur, an active top-down expectation selects the cells 
whose input features are consistent with the active prototype, and suppresses those that are not, 
thereby generating an attentional focus on the combinations of features that may be expected in 
that situation. This matching and attentional process can synchronize and amplify the activities 
of selected cells, leading to a context-sensitive state of "resonance." Such a matching process 
has been mathematically proved to be necessary to stabilize the memory of learned 
representations in response to a complex input environment (e.g., Carpenter and Grossberg, 
1991). In order to realize these matching properties, top-down expectations and attention were 
predicted to be controlled by top-down on-center off-surround networks (Figure 3c ). A balance 
between top-down excitation and inhibition in the on-center of this network leads to a 
modulatory effect of top-down attention in the on-center on its target cells, even while cells that 
are in the off-surround may be strongly inhibited. Recent psychophysical and neurophysiological 
data have supported many of these ART predictions; see Raizada and Grossberg (2003) for a 
revtew. 
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Figure 3. (a) Patterns of activation, or short-term memory (STM), across feature-selective cells at a lower 
processing level send signals via bottom-up pathways to a higher processing level. Cells at the higher level respond 
selectively to prescribed combinations of features at the lower level. For example, such cells may represent 
recognition categories, as in inferotemporal cortex. The selective activation of category cells is achieved by 
multiplying the bottom-up signals with adaptive weights, or learned long-term memory (LTM) traces at the ends of 
the bottom-up pathways, before these learning-gated signals activate target category cells. The active category cells, 
in turn, activate top-down pathways that read-out learned expectations via their own LTM traces. These top-down 
expectations are matched against the STM pattern that is active at the lower featurallevel. (b) This matching process 
confirms, synchronizes, and amplifies STM activities of features that are supported by large LTM traces in an active 
top-down expectation, and suppresses STM activities of features that do not get top-down support. The size of the 
hemidisks at the end of the top-down pathways represents the strength of the learned L TM trace that is stored in that 
pathway. (c) The ART Matching Rule may be realized by a modulatory top-down on-center off-surround network. 
In particular, bottom-up inputs, such as in pathways 1 and 2, can activate their feature-selective cells when no top-
down expectation is active. When a top··down expectation is active whose prototype (the learned on-center with 
positive pathways) does not include the feature activated by pathway l, then the top-down off-surround cancels the 
bottom-up input, thereby suppressing activation of that feature. Since the feature that is activated by pathway 2 is 
included in the top-down prototype, the top-down excitation and inhibition approximately cancel (typically, with a 
small positive priming bias), so that activation of the corresponding feature-selective cell is preserved, synchronized, 
and even amplified. [Reprinted with permission from Grossberg (1999).] 
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The ART model proposes how the brain has exploited the modulatory property of expectations 
and attention to enable fantasy, imagery, and planning activities to occur. In particular, phasic 
volitional signals can shift the balance between excitation and inhibition to favor net excitatory 
activation when a top-down expectation is active. Such a volitionally-mediated shift enables top-
down expectations, in the absence of supportive bottom-up inputs, to cause conscious 
experiences of imagery and inner speech, and thereby to enable fantasy and planning activities to 
occur. If, however, these volitional signals become tonically hyperactive during a mental 
disorder, the top-down expectations can give rise to conscious experiences in the absence of 
bottom-up inputs and volition. Data about schizophrenic hallucinations have been rationalized by 
these model properties (Grossberg, 2000a). Related work has predicted the detailed laminar 
circuits within the visual cmiex wherein these top-down expectations and volitional signals may 
act, and by extension in other sensory and cognitive neocotiical areas (Grossberg, 1999a, 
Grossberg and Raizada, 2000; Raizada and Grossberg, 2003). The ability of top-down 
expectations to activate internal representations that support imagery, fantasy, and planning 
activities raises the question of how these expectations are themselves controlled? Below it is 
suggested how interactions between cognitive-emotional mechanisms from Co gEM and of 
cognitive and perceptual mechanisms of ART help to clarify this issue. 
Before turning to these interactions, it is worthwhile to mention another property of ART which 
seems to be relevant to autism. This property concerns the manner in which the brain controls the 
contents, patticularly the level of abstractness, of leamed prototypes. It proposes an answer to the 
basic question: How is the generality of knowledge controlled? This issue is of particular 
importance in the light of the concreteness, hypervigilance, and hyperspecificity of autistic 
behavioral symptoms. 
How is the generality of knowledge controlled? Exemplars, prototypes, and vigilance 
What information is bound together into object or event representations? Some evidence 
suggests that exemplars, or individual experiences, can be learned and remembered, like those of 
familiar faces (Medin, Altom, and Murphy, 1984; Medin and Shaffer, 1978; Medin and Smith, 
1981). However, this cannot be the final answer to this question, since storing every exemplar, or 
at least every memory as an exemplar, can lead to a combinatorial explosion of memory storage, 
to unwieldy memory retrieval, and to an inability to learn general or abstract properties of the 
world. Others believe that we learn prototypes (Posner and Keele, 1970; Smith and Minda, 1998, 
2000; Smith, Murray, and Minda, 1997) that represent more general properties of the world, such 
as that everyone has a face. But then how do we learn specific episodic memories, and how is the 
appropriate level of generalization and abstraction determined? 
ART provides an answer to this question that overcomes these problems and clarifies how the 
inferotemporal cortex, interacting with prefrontal cortex and the hippocampal system, learns to 
recognize and classify objects and events. In particular, one class of thirty human cognitive 
experiments (the so-called 4/5 category structure) has been used to test conflicting views in the 
prototype .. exemplar debate, but cognitive models have not described how categories are leamed 
(Medin, Altom, and Murphy, 1984; Nosofsky, Kruschke, and McKinley, 1992; Smith and 
Minda, 2000). Neurophysiology labs have also collected data about monkey cell responses from 
inferotemporal cortex during recognition tasks (Desimone, 1991; Desimone and Ungerleider, 
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1989; Gochin, Miller, Gross, and Gerstein, 1991; Harries and Perrett, 1991; Mishkin, 1978, 
1982; Mishkin and Appenzeller, 1987; Pen·ett, Mistlin, and Chitty, 1987; Schwartz, Desimone, 
Albright, and Gross, 1983). An ART model has been developed that quantitatively simulates the 
human data from the 4/5 category structure experiments and clarifies neurophysiological data 
about how monkeys learn to categorize both prototypes and exemplars (Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1991; Ersoy, Carpenter, and Grossberg, 2002; Grossberg, 1980, 1999b). 
In this proposal, ART learns prototypes that consist of the critical feature patterns to which an 
individual attends. The generality of these prototypes is determined by the network's vigllance, 
which is controlled by environmental feedback or internal volition. Low vigilance permits 
learning of general categories with abstract prototypes. High vigilance forces memory search to 
occur when even small mismatches exist between an exemplar and the category that it activates. 
Given high enough vigilance, a category prototype may encode an individual exemplar. Normal 
behavior enables vigilance to track the demands of a particular environment, creating specific or 
general categories as needed to solve environmental problems. In a network whose vigilance is 
fixed through time at an abnormally high level, the system would be literally "hypervigilant," 
with the consequence that environmental events would be classified with extreme concreteness 
and hyperspecificity, because all categories would code highly specific, exemplar-like 
information. 
Given that vigilance control can enable a learning individual to learn either abstract and general, 
or concrete and specific, information as a particular learning environment demands, it is 
important to understand how vigilance control is realized under normal circumstances. Vigilance 
control is part of the process whereby top-down expectations attempt to match incoming bottom-
up information, and determines whether a match is deemed good enough to trigger new learning. 
How are learning, attention, memory search, hypervigilancc, and hyperspeci!1city related? 
In particular, a sufficiently bad mismatch between an active top-down expectation and a bottom-
up input, say because the input represents an unfamiliar type of experience, can drive a memory 
search, or hypothesis testing in the following way: A mismatch within the attentional system, 
where bottom-up and top-down information are matched, is proposed to activate a 
complementary orienting system, which is thus activated by unexpected and unfamiliar events 
(Figure 4). ART suggests that this orienting system includes the hippocampal system, which has 
long been known to be involved in mismatch processing, including the processing of novel 
events (e.g., Otto and Eichenbaum, 1992; Vinogradova, 2001). Output signals from the orienting 
system rapidly reset the recognition category that has been reading out the poorly matching top-
down expectation (Figure 4b and 4c ). The cause of the mismatch is hereby removed, thereby 
freeing the system to activate a different recognition category (Figure 4d). The reset event hereby 
triggers a memory search, which automatically leads to the selection of a recognition category 
that can better match the input. If no such recognition category exists, say because the bottom-up 
input represents a truly novel experience, then the search process automatically activates an as 
yet uncommitted population of cells, with which to learn a new recognition category to represent 
the novel information. 
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Figure 4. Search for a recognition code within Adaptive Resonance Theory: (a) The input pattern I is instated across 
the feature detectors at level F1 as a short term memory (STM) activity pattern X. Input I also nonspecifically 
activates the orienting subsystem A. STM pattern X is represented by the gray pattern across F1• Pattern X both 
inhibits A and generates the output patternS. PatternS is multiplied by long term memory (LTM) traces, or learned 
adaptive weights. These LTM-gated signals are added at F2 nodes to form the input pattern T, which activates the 
contrast-enhanced STM pattern Y across the recognition categories coded at level F2. (b) Pattern Y generates the top-
down output pattern U which is multiplied by top-down LTM traces and added at F 1 nodes to form the prototype 
pattern V that encodes the learned expectation of the active F2 nodes. If V mismatches I at Fh then a new STM 
activity pattern X* is generated at F1• X* is represented by the gray pattern. It includes the features of I that are 
confirmed by the top-down expectation V. Mismatched features are inhibited. The inactivated nodes corresponding 
to unconfirmed features of X are unhatched. The reduction in total STM activity which occurs when X is 
transformed into X* causes a decrease in the total inhibition from F 1 to A. (c) If inhibition decreases sufficiently, A 
releases a nonspecific arousal wave to F2, which resets the categorical STM pattern Y at F2. (d) After Y is inhibited, 
its top-down prototype signal is eliminated, and activity pattern X can be reinstated at F1. Enduring traces of the 
prior reset lead X to activate a different STM pattern Y* at F2. If the top-down prototype clue to Y* also mismatches I 
at F~o then the search for an F2 code continues until a more appropriate F2 representation is selected. Then an 
attentive resonance develops and learning of the attended data is initiated. [_Adapted with permission from Grossberg 
and Merrill (1996).] 
Vigilance is computed within the ART orienting system (p in Figure 4). Here, bottom-up 
excitation from each of the feature-activating pathways in an input pattern I is balanced against 
inhibition from each of the activated feature-selective cells (Figure 4a). These feature-selective 
cells reside at the processing level labelled F1 in Figure 4. If a top-down expectation also acts on 
F1 , then only the "matched features" are active there, due to the ART Matching Rule (Figure 
4b). That is, the activity pattern X caused solely by the bottom-up inputs I across the feature-
selective cells (Figure 4a) is transformed into the pattern X* across the matched features (Figure 
4b ), thereby reducing the total inhibition to the orienting system. As a result of this reduction in 
inhibition, if the mismatch between the bottom-up input pattem and the prototype of the top-
down expectation is too great to satisfy the vigilance criterion, then a reset or "novelty" wave is 
activated (Figure 4c). Such a novelty wave takes the form of a burst of nonspecific activation 
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that inhibits the active recognition category at level F2 in Figure 4c, and thereby triggers a search 
for another, better-matching, recognition category, as in Figure 4d. More specifically, vigilance p 
weighs how similar an input exemplar I must be to a top-down prototype V in order for 
resonance to occur. Resonance occurs if p times the total bottom-up input I to the orienting 
system is less than the total inhibition from X* to the orienting system. Then the orienting system 
is inhibited, and resonance between levels F1 and F2 can develop. If, however, this inequality is 
reversed, then the orienting system can be activated, leading to a nonspecific novelty wave that 
can reset the presently active category and initiate search for a better-matching one. Vigilance p 
is thus the relative gain of excitation to inhibition to the orienting system. 
ART suggests how this vigilance gain criterion can be adjusted up and down within the orienting 
system to learn more specific or general information, respectively, in response to predictive 
failures within each environment. For example, if a predictive failure causes vigilance to 
increase, then it becomes easier to reset the category which caused the failure and to search for a 
better representation of the world. ART hereby clarifies how the brain can try to learn an 
efficient representation of the type of information that is useful in any given situation, which will 
typically include combinations of both specific and general categories; that is, of both exemplars 
and more general prototypes. If, however, the vigilance gain criterion gets "stuck" at a high 
level, then concreteness, hyperspecificity, and hypervigilance will ensue. 
Given that persistently high vigilance can cause the learning of concrete and hypcrspecific 
category prototypes, both in the bottom-up filtering and top-down expectation pathways, it 
follows from the influence of these top-down expectations on attentional focusing that attentional 
deficits may also be expected in a hypervigilant individual. 
Gated Dipole Opponent Processing: Invcrted-ll, Antagonistic Rebound, and Perseveration 
Given this background, let us now consider in somewhat greater detail how opponent emotions, 
like fear and relief, or hunger and frustration, may be organized in the brain, and how they may 
become depressed. More generally, it has been proposed that opponent emotions are a special 
case of a more general brain design for opponent processing, including opponent perceptual 
features, like reel and green colors, or downward and upward motions, or horizontal and vertical 
orientations. All of these different examples have the property of generating antagonistic 
rebounds whereby, say, offset of a sustained fearful cue can elicit relief, or removal of a desired 
food can elicit frustration, or offset of a sustained red image can yield a green aftereffect, or 
offset of a sustained downward motion of water can yield an upward motion aftereffect, or offset 
of a sustained image with radial spokes of a wheel can yield an aftereffect of concentric circles, 
and so on. In all of these cases, there are ON and OFF channels that can experience an 
antaonistic rebound. ART predicts that all of these examples are special cases of a general 
opponent processing design, and proposes how opponent processing rebounds may play a key 
role in controlling reset and search, as discussed above, as well as in rebalancing sensory, 
cognitive, emotional, and motoric representations in response to rapidly changing environmental 
inputs. 
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Figure 5. A gated dipole opponent process can generate habituative ON responses and transient OFF rebounds in 
response to the phasic onset and offset, respectively, of the input J to its ON channel. Term I delivers the nonspecific 
arousal that energizes antagonistic rebounds when the phasic input J shuts off. Terms y 1 and Y2 are the habituative 
transmitter gates in the ON and OFF channels. They convert the step-on-baseline activity pattern x1 into the 
overshoot-habituation-undershoot-habituation pattern at activity x5 • Next, the opponent interaction works; namely, 
the baseline activity x4 in the OFF channel due to the arousal I is subtracted from the habituative ON activity x3 to 
yield x5 . When activity x5 is thresholded to generate an ON output signal, it has an initial overshoot of activation, 
followed by habituation. When the signs are reversed in the OFF channel, the antagonistic rebound is generated as 
the mirror~image of the undershoot-habituation part of the ON channel activity at };·6 , when it is thresholded to 
generate the transient OFF output signal. [Reprinted with permission from Grossberg (2000).] 
Such opponent processing circuits exhibit a Golden Mean of optimal behavior at an intermediate 
arousal level (Grossberg, 1972b, 1980, 1984a, 1984b, 2000b ), as noted in Figure 2. For larger or 
smaller levels of arousal, behavior deteriorates in different ways, thereby giving rise to an 
Invetted-U in network performance as a function of its arousal level. Both the Inverted-U and the 
antagonistic rebound arc the result of habituative transmitters that exist in the opponent channels, 
where they multiply, or gate, the signals on their way to the opponent, or competitive, processing 
stage (Figure 5). Due to the factors that are summarized in Figure 5, when arousal is too small, 
such an opponent process experiences an elevated response threshold in response to an ON 
channel input, since there is not enough arousal to support a more normal response threshold. 
Paradoxically, it also gives rise to hyperexcitable, or larger than normal, responses to increments 
in the ON input that exceed this elevated threshold. When arousal is too large, the opponent 
process experiences a low behavioral threshold. Paradoxically, it also gives rise to hypoexcitable, 
or smaller than normal, responses, in response to increments in the ON input that exceed this 
reduced threshold. Due to these properties, an increase in arousal can decrease the sensitivity of 
an underaroused opponent process of this kind, and can bring it into the normal behavioral range. 
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This opponent processing model is called a "gated dipole" because habituative transmitters 
"gate," or multiply, signal processing in each of the channels of the opponent "dipole." Due to 
the particular Inverted-U property of a gated dipole, a pharmacological "up" like amphetamine 
can reduce the supra-threshold hypersensitivity of patients with underaroused circuits, such as 
certain attention deficit disorder patients. 
Another paradoxical property of an underaroused dipole is that an unexpected event, that triggers 
a nonspecific arousal burst, can cause a paradoxical amplification of activity in the ON channel 
of the dipole, instead of the more normal antagonistic rebound of activity in the OFF channel. 
Thus, instead of resetting the dipole in response to the unexpected event, an unexpected event 
can instead cause the dipole to maintain, even enhance, the activity in its currently active 
channels. Such an enhancement can result in perseveration, rather than flexible disengagement 
and shifting of attention. Split attention, shifting attention, and joint attention, which requires a 
flexible shift of the balance of split attention from an object of social value, such as a mother's 
gaze to another object, and back again, may thus all impaired in such an underaroused model and 
is observed among autistics. If, however, an arousal burst is sufficiently strong, then an unusually 
intense antagonistic rebound can be caused. 
These perseverative and rebound properties emerge through interactions across an entire gated 
dipole circuit. They cannot be understood just by looking at the pharmacology or 
neurophysiology of individual cells within the circuit. When their effects ramify throughout the 
sensory and prefrontal cortices with which they interact, as in Figures 1 and 4, they can lead to a 
number of clinical symptoms. 
When Hypervigilant and Hyperspecific Learning Modulates Underaroused Opponent 
Circuits 
Let us suppose that certain autistics are underaroused, and consider what can happen when this 
property is combined with their hyperspecific and hypervigilant learning. That is, consider how 
an underaroused CogEm model interacts with a hypervigilant ART model. In this combined 
system, various formal symptoms emerge that may be interestingly compared with the behavior 
of autistic patients. For example, suppose that positive affect or approach motivates an action. 
Underaroused emotional and sensory dipoles can exhibit a paradoxical enhancement of their ON 
channel activities in response to a nonspecific arousal burst that is caused by an unexpected 
event. Such an enhancement could be caused by an arousal burst in response to the high 
probability that sensory events will mismatch the hyperspecific top-down expectations of an 
autistic individual. A persistent perseverative behavior can result, which might manifest itself in 
persistently inspecting the same sensory cue. Suppose, however, that the arousal burst is larger, 
say due to a larger mismatch of the world with the presently active hyperspecific category. Then 
an unusually intense, and negative, antagonistic rebound can be caused. Thus, novel experiences 
can be highly aversive when hyperspecific categories mismatch them and suddenly generate a 
burst of arousal to the system's underaroused dipoles. These negative rebounds may be one 
reason why autistics are prone to tantrums. 
When one considers the plight of any individual who combines these two mechanisms, it 
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becomes clear that one coping strategy is to avoid the type of novelty that will cause unbearable 
negative rebounds. The other side of the coin is perseveration on small details of the 
environment. Such a combination of properties may help to understand the autistic "need for 
sameness" in many situations, and the fact that behavioral decompensation often occurs in 
response to what a normal person would view as relatively minor variations in routines. 
Resonant Interactions between Sensory Cortices, Amygdala, and Prefrontal Cortex 
The most immediate effect of a depressed response in the outputs of emotion-representing areas 
is flat affect, although how this is understood must be carefully evaluated, as indicated in the 
preceding discussion, as to whether a stimulus exceeds the elevated threshold for responsiveness. 
This defect, in turn, may cause an inability to represent others' beliefs and intentions, in the 
sense that all mental states that depend upon interpreting one's own emotional state, or the 
emotional states of others, can be diminished. Such a deficiency can cause major difficulties in 
social communication. It happens in the Co gEM model of Figure 1 because emotionally charged 
sensory inputs, such as the expressions on other people's faces or their tone of voice, will 
activate the appropriate part of temporal cortex but may not elicit an appropriate emotional 
response from the amygdala and related emotion-representing circuits. 
A problem with impoverishment of will, as well as with the setting of goals and intentions, can 
then indirectly arise. This happens in the model because the depressed response of the emotional 
representations depresses the incentive motivational signals that would normally activate the 
prefrontal cortex in response to motivationally salient events (Figure 1). As a result, the 
prefrontal cortex will not be adequately activated, and a hypofrontal condition can emerge. Due 
to this hypofrontality, the working memory representations and plans that are ordinarily formed 
within the prefrontal cortex will be degraded, so social goals and plans will not form in a normal 
fashion. 
Given such a hypofrontal response, top-down signals from the prefrontal cortex to the sensory 
cortices will also be reduced or eliminated (Figure 1). As a result, the sensory representations 
will not be able to use these top-down signals to organize information processing according to its 
emotional meaning or motivational goals. Said in another way, motivationally irrelevant 
information will not be blocked from attention, so it will be able to continually intrude, leading 
to abnormal distractability. 
Adaptively Timed Learning, Motivation, Attention, and Action 
The above discussion illustrates one aspect of a major conceptual dichotomy that is often used in 
research about normal and amnesic learning and memory. This dichotomy concerns the 
distinction between processes that are variously called declarative memory and procedural 
memory, knowing that and knowing how, memory and habit, or memory with record and 
memory without record (Bruner, 1969; Mishkin, 1982, 1993; Ryle, 1949; Squire and Cohen, 
1984). The amnesic patient HM exemplified this distinction by learning and remembering motor 
skills like assembly of the Tower of Hanoi without being able to recall having done so (Bruner, 
1969; Cohen and Squire, 1980; Mishkin, 1982; Ryle, 1949; Scoville and Milner, 1957; Squire 
and Cohen, 1984). HM's surgical lesion included extensive parts of the hippocampal formation 
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and amygdala. Subsequent animal studies have shown that damage to the hippocampal formation 
(Ammon's horn, dentate gyrus, subiculum, fornix) and the parahippocampal region (entorhinal, 
perirhinal, and parahippocampal cmtices) can reproduce analogous amnesic symptoms (Mishkin, 
1978; Squire and Zola-Morgan, 1991). These results implicate this aggregate hippocampal 
system in the processes that regulate declarative memory, or "knowing that". Such processes 
support a competence for learning recognition categories and being able to flexibly access them 
in a task-specific way (Eichenbaum, Otto, and Cohen, 1994). The discussion of ART above is 
about declarative memory, particularly about the leaming of recognition categories, and involves 
predicted interactions between cortical and hippocampal representations. Indeed, ART has been 
used to propose an explanation of various data about medial temporal amnesia (Carpenter and 
Grossberg, 1993). 
A parallel line of research has implicated the cerebellum in the processing of procedural 
memory, or "knowing how". The cerebellum is an essential circuit for conditioning discrete 
adaptive responses during eye movements, arm movements, nictitating membrane movements, 
and jaw movements (Ebner and Bloedel, 1981; Gilbert and Thach, 1977; Ito, 1984; Lisberger, 
1988; Optican and Robinson, 1980; Thompson, 1988; Thompson eta!., 1984, 1987). Models of 
cerebellar learning have been developed over the years to help explain these motor conditioning 
data (Albus, 1971; Fiala, Grossberg, and Bullock, 1996; Fujita, 1982a, 1982b; Grossberg, 1969, 
1972b; Grossberg and Kuperstein, 1986; Ito, 1984; Lisberger, 1988; Marr, 1969). 
A key property of cerebellar learning is that it is adaptively timed, so that learned responses are 
emitted at times that are appropriate within the constraints of the learning paradigm. Cognitive-
emotional learning is also adaptively timed, so that motivated attention can be maintained on 
salient goal objects for the necessary amount of time to carry out goal-directed actions. Unless 
motivated attention and action are both adaptively timed, an animal or human could be 
condemned to either emit premature goal-oriented responses, or to generate maladaptive 
orienting and exploratory movements in any situation wherein a goal object does not 
immediately appear. These two types of adaptively timed learning cooperate in normal learning 
subjects so that both attention and action can be timed to generate adaptive behavior in each 
environment. 
In particular, during classical conditioning, a conditioned stimulus (CS) such as a tone or light, 
when paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) such as a shock, can learn to generate 
conditioned responses (CR), such as fear or limb withdrawal, that were originally elicited only 
by the US. Such learning is optimal at a range of positive interstimulus intervals (ISI) between 
the CS and US that are characteristic of the animal and the task, and is greatly attenuated at zero 
ISI and long ISis. Within this range, learned responses are timed to match the statistics of the 
learning environment (Smith, 1968). Although the amygdala has been identified as a primary 
site in the expression of emotion and stimulus-reward association (Aggleton, 1993), as 
summarized in Figure 1, the hippocampal formation has been implicated in the adaptively timed 
processing of cognitive-emotional interactions. For example, Thompson et al. (1987) 
distinguished two types of learning that go on during conditioning of the rabbit Nictitating 
Membrane Response: adaptively timed "conditioned fear" learning linked to the hippocampus 
and adaptively timed "learning of the discrete adaptive response" within the cerebellum. 
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A 
T 
Figure 6. The simplest version of the START model. Processing stages S lJ and s(2J play the role of sensory cortex 
and prefrontal cortex, respectively, in the CogEM model circuit of Figure 1. StageD is an emotional center, or drive 
representation, like the amygdala in Figure 1. Stage M schematizes motor output pathways. The feedback pathways 
D~> S 2J-> 5/lJ from a particular drive representation to sensory representations are capable of focussing attention on 
motivationally consistent events in the world. The excitatory pathways from g.n .......,> D learn the conditioned 
reinforcer properties of a sensory cue, such as a CS, whereas the pathways D--> S..r. 2; learn the incentive motivational 
properties of cues. Representations in S(2) can fire vigorously only if they receive convergent signals from S1l and D, 
corresponding to the sensitivity of orbitofrontal cortex to both sensory and reinforcing properties of cues. Then they 
deliver positive feedback to s0 l and bias the competition among sensory representations to focus attention on their 
respective features and to attentionally block inhibited features. Prior to conditioning, a CS can be stored at Sl) and 
can prime D and S 2' without supraliminally firing these representations. After conditioning, the CS can trigger 
strong conditioned s0 ) -7 D-7 S 2'-> sn feedback and rapidly draw attention to itself as it activates the emotional 
representations and motivational pathways controlled by D. Representation D can also inhibit the orienting system A 
as it focuses attention upon motivationally valued sensory events. Here is one way in which the CogEn1 and ART 
models interact: Emotionally salient goal objects can inhibit the orienting system and thus prevent irrelevant 
distractors from attracting attention when there is an ART mismatch. This inhibition of the orienting system 
becomes adaptively timed as follows: The sensory representations s/1} send pathways to a spectral timing circuit T, 
assumed to be in the dentate-CA3 region of the hippocampus (see the text), whose adaptive weights z are trained by 
a Now Print, or teaching signal, N. The teaching signal N is transiently activated by changes in the activity of the 
drive representation D that occur when a reinforcing event activates D. After conditioning of T takes place, 
adaptively timed readout from T can maintain attention on task-relevant cues by amplifying their cortical 
representations 8(2} while inhibiting the orienting system A for an adaptively timed duration. In the figure, the 
simplest such inhibitory path is depicted, directly from T to D and thereupon to S,(2'and A. In vivo, a more complex 
set of pathways exists. [Reprinted with permission from Grossberg and Merrill (1992).] 
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An extension of the ART model, called the START model (Fiala, Grossberg, and Bullock, 1996; 
Grossberg and Menill, 1992, 1996; Grossberg and Schmajuk, 1987), for Spectrally Timed ART 
model, proposes a unified explanation of why both the hippocampal system and the cerebellum 
may need adaptive timing circuits for their normal functioning (Figures 6 and 7). The START 
model proposes that the motivational mechanisms within the amygdala, and related emotion-
representing brain areas, by rapidly drawing motivated attention to salient cues, could 
prematurely release motor commands, via the circuits in Figure 1a, were these commands not 
adaptively timed by the cerebellum. Figure 7 summarizes a model of how the cerebellum 
adaptively times its motor commands by using a "spectrum" of learning sites that are each 
sensitive to a different range of delays between CS and US. A process of "spectrally timed 
learning" selects that subset of sites whose reaction rates match the ISis between the CS and the 
US. Such learning enables the cerebellar output to be released at around the time when the US is 
expected. 
Parallel 
Fibers 
CS-Activated 
Input Pathways 
Purkinje 
Cells 
T 
CEREBELLAR 
CORTEX 
(timing) 
SUBCORTICAL 
NUCLEUS 
(gain control) 
US-Activated 
Climbing Fibers 
Figure 7. A model of adaptively timed cerebellar learning: A conditioned stimulus (CS), say via the motor output 
pathway M in Figure 6, activates pathways to both a subcortical cerebellar nucleus and to cerebellar cortex parallel 
fibers that synapse on Purkinje cells. US-activated climbing fibers provide a teaching signal that also converges 
upon the parallel fiber/Purkinje cell synapses. This teaching signal causes synapses to become weaker (Long Term 
Depression) if they are activated by the CS when the US teaching signal becomes active. Synapses whose activity 
does not overlap the climbing fiber signals become stronger (Long Term Potentiation). Because the Purkinje cells 
tonically inhibit their subcortical target cells, their adaptively timed inhibition by the CS disinhibits the effect of 
tonic Purkinje cell outputs on cerebellar nuclear cells. In other words, a timed gate opens and allows the subcortical 
cells to fire. The climbing fibers also control learning of adaptive gains along subcortical pathways through the 
nuclear cells. Thus, when the adaptively timed Purkinje cell gate opens, the learned gains can be expressed at the 
correct time and with the correct amplitude to cause a correctly calibrated motor response. [Reprinted with 
permission from Grossberg and Merrill (1996).] 
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In addition to adaptive timing within the cerebellum, there is a need for adaptively timed, 
motivated attention to prevent in-elevant novel events from prematurely resetting the 
thalamocortical representations that actively read out adaptively timed responses. For example, 
suppose that an animal inspects a food box right after a signal occurs that has regularly predicted 
food delivery in six seconds. Why is not the mismatch between the learned expectation of food 
and the percept of no-food treated like a predictive failure? Why, as often occurs when a 
previously rewarded cue is no longer rewarded, does not such an expected non-occurrence of 
food trigger reset of attention, frustration, forgetting, and exploratory behavior? Were this to 
happen, humans and animals would restlessly explore their environments without being able to 
wait for delayed rewards. 
The ART model clarified how attentional and orienting systems interact to categorize 
information and to develop resonant states if the top-down prototype and the bottom-up input 
form a sufficiently good match. If the mismatch is too big for resonance to occur, then other 
things being equal, the orienting subsystem can trigger a search for a better category with which 
to categorize the information. The hippocampus is proposed to be part of the orienting system 
that is activated by these mismatches and relays them as novelty-sensitive reset bursts to the 
thalamocortical system. Such an ART-mediated activation of the orienting system is not, 
however, sensitive to whether the novel event that caused the mismatch is relevant to the task. 
The START model clarifies how mismatches may be modulated by task-relevance in an 
adaptively timed way. In particular, Figure 7 suggests how adaptively timed learning within the 
dentate-CA3 circuits of the hippocampus (Berger, Berry, and Thompson, 1986) is proposed to 
inhibit the activation of the orienting system during an interval wherein a valued and predictable 
goal is being achieved. Indeed, hippocampal dentate-CA3 cell firing commonly reflects the 
learned delays observed during the rabbit nictitating membrane response. A model simulation of 
this sort of adaptive timing is summarized in Figure 8. The START model proposes how 
adaptively timed inhibition of the hippocampal orienting system and adaptively timed 
disinhibition of cerebellar nuclear cells are coordinated to enable motivated attention to be 
maintained on a goal while adaptively timed responses are released to obtain the goal. 
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(b) 
t 
(c) 
Figure 8. A computer simulation of spectral timing in the dentate-CA3 circuit. The functions gij represent 
differently timed activations in response to a CS input. The CS input turns on at the time marked by the leftmost 
vertical dashed line. The US turns on at the time marked by the rightmost vertical clashed line. !::.'unctions hij are the 
functions gij multiplied by the corresponding adaptive weights that gate, or multiply, each of them. When these 
adaptively weighted signals are added up, they form a total output signal R that is adaptively timed to peak at 
around the ISI where the US turns on. Thus, spectral timing is a property of an entire population of adaptively gated 
pathways. (Reprinted with permission from Grossberg and Merrill (1992). 
A great deal of data has been rationalized using these circuits, including data about how lesions 
of the hippocampal system may lead to symptoms of medial temporal amnesia, and about data 
fTom delayed non-match to sample (DNMS) experiments wherein both temporal delays and 
novelty-sensitive recognition processes are involved (Gaffan, 1974; Mishkin and Delacour, 
1975). In summary, as shown in Figures 6 and 7, the START model enables three key properties 
to simultaneously obtain: 
1. Fast Motivated Attention. Rapid focusing of attention on motivationally salient cues occurs from 
regions like the amygala to prefrontal cortex (the D-7 S12! pathway in Figure 6). Without further 
processing, fast activation of the CS-activated s!2l sensory representations could prematurely 
release motor behaviors. 
2. Adoptively Timed Responding. Adaptively timed read-out of responses via cerebellar circuits, as 
in Figure 7, enables learned responses to be released at task-appropriate times, despite the fact 
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that CS cortical representations can be quickly activated by fast motivated attention. 
3. Adaptively Timed Duration of Motivated Attention and Inhibition of Orienting Responses. 
Adaptively timed inhibition of mismatch-sensitive cells in the orienting system of the 
hippocampus (pathway T ~D~ A in Figure 6) prevents the premature reset of active CS 
representations by potentially distracting irrelevant cues during variable task-specific delays. 
This inhibition is patt of the competition that exists between consummatory and orienting 
behaviors (Staddon, 1983). This mechanism helps the CS representations to remain active, as 
does the adaptively timed incentive motivation that enhances their activation in sh01t-term 
memory. As a result, the CS representations can continue to read-out the sensory signals that will 
elicit adaptively timed responding. 
Our main proposal in the present article is that when various START-like mechanisms become 
imbalanced in the brain-notably, underaroused depression in the drive representations of 
regions like the amygdala, hypervigilant learning in the recognition learning circuits of sensory 
and prefrontal cortices, and a failure of adaptive timing in the hippocampal and cerebellar 
circuits-then many formal analogs of autistic behavioral symptoms emerge. That is why we call 
the model the Imbalanced START, or iSTART, model. For example, flexible shifts of attention 
can be impaired because, if the timing circuit T is damaged, attention may more easily be 
distracted from goal objects during task-related delays. On the other hand, if the orienting 
system is also damaged, then flexible reset of attention in response to novel events is impaired, 
thereby eliminating a key mechanism whereby a distracting event could undermine perf01mance. 
If the attentional system remains intact, then direct activations of individual recognition codes in 
response to a familiar event is still possible, and the matching process can partially update short-
term memory. However, the network can no longer flexibly search for the proper configuration 
of targets to attend, especially in the presence of complex spatial layouts that include distracting 
cues. The lack of timed control over variable delays can thus harm behavior more when it is 
necessary to shift attention among different sets of cues. Gaffan (1992) has described analogous 
data from hippocampectomized monkeys. 
Adaptive timing, reward, motivational, and cognitive circuits all interact in the iSTART model 
via feedback. For example, rewards and punishments can feed into the cerebellar-mediated 
adaptive timing circuits in the hippocampus, and assure that properly timed responses are 
reinforced. The adaptive timing circuits, in turn, help to assure that responses are released at the 
proper times to be rewarded during subsequent experiences. 
A Link Between Hypervigilance and Adaptive Timing 
The above discussion considered how various model properties similar to autlstlc symptoms 
could arise if cognitive learning was hypervigilant and cognitive-emotional interactions were 
modulated by underaroused depression of motivational centers. Let us now consider how adding 
adaptive timing to the discussion can further clarify how autistic symptoms may arise. In 
particular, early in development, emotional needs may begin to be met by responding with 
simple motor patterns in response to basic sensory stimuli. Successful development requires the 
ability to learn to adaptively time new actions to receive the potentially rewarding consequences 
of these actions. If new adaptively timed movements cannot be learned, then the rewards that 
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would normally be contingent upon them may not be fmthcoming. If behaviors are not 
adaptively timed, then spurious resets of attention may more readily occur, as noted in item (3) 
above. Social skills and language development, in palticular, are learned through adaptively 
timed releases of behavior in a process of shared attention and imitation. Under these 
circumstances, a wide variety of social behaviors do not get a chance to be learned, and attention 
is instead maintained on lower-order sensory representations and tasks. The above considerations 
suggest that part of the reason that representations of typical social significance may fail to 
develop is that they may not get a chance to be strongly reinforced. One can also speculate that 
the breakdown of the normal cycle of behavior and reward, with a dramatic reduction in 
behaviorally appropriate rewards, can in itself contribute to a reduction in the arousal of 
emotional centers, thereby leading to the types of symptoms, reviewed above, that occur when 
drive representations are underaroused. 
The frequent spurious orienting resets that can occur due to dysfunctional adaptive timing may 
also contribute to hyperspecific learning. If sensory inputs are prematurely reset, then this can 
interfere with the normal cycle of adaptively timed shifting of attention to the expected 
consequences of motor actions. Such a learner could not easily test whether variations on a 
sensory event predict similar consequences, so abstract prototype formation may not have a 
chance to occur. If drive satisfaction requires behaviors contingent upon having developed a 
more generalized, abstract prototype, then drives may consequently become depressed. 
A depressed drive representation, in itself, can make it more difficult to generate the drive-
mediated learning signals that are needed to trigger adaptivcly timed hippocampal and cerebellar 
learning, as shown in Figure 6 (see the Now Print signal N). A vicious feedback circuit can 
result in which depressed drives fail to trigger the learning of adaptively timed behaviors, whose 
absence enables the orienting system to be spuriously reset during times when attention should 
be given to a particular task, which then leads to hyperspecific learning, which then makes it 
easier to generate mismatch events, which then prevents the normal frequency of behaviorally-
appropriate rewards from being received, which then contributes to the maintenance of depressed 
drives. 
In addition, as noted above, depressed drive representations may cause a hypofrontal syndrome; 
see Figure l. As a result, the normal motivationally-selective top-down attentional priming 
signals to sensory cortices do not occur, attentional blocking fails, and motivationally irrelevant 
information can flood the sensory system, thereby making it even harder to process 
motivationally-relevant sensory cues, so that drives continue to be unmet, rewards unreceived, 
and the cycle perpetuates itself through this route as well. 
Among the motivationally irrelevant information flooding the system are a variety of lower-order 
sensory representations, which, having built-in pathways to emotional centers, can overcome 
their elevated threshold due to underarousal with resultant maladaptive excessive responses. 
This property is consistent with the hypersensitivity of autistics to a variety of lower order 
stimuli, such as noise and touch. 
Deficient development of language would be predicted within this model. Language 
development requires several factors. It requires shared attention with a caretaker and splitting 
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attention between the objects of that shared attention, analysis of the sounds being produced, of 
the sounds just heard, and of the motor actions required to make those sounds. Language 
development requires the formation and application of high-level top-down representations of 
linguistic structure and word meaning. Indeed, ART dynamics have been used to explain a 
variety of data about speech perception and word recognition, including the need to use top-
down expectations and attention to dynamically group an evolving sequences of incoming 
sounds (e.g., Grossberg, Boardman, and Cohen, 1997; Grossberg and Myers, 2000). Language 
development also requires adaptive timing to produce complex sequential motor patterns in 
imitation of sequential sensory inputs, and cerebellar adaptive timing mechanisms have been 
implicated in the ability to learn complex sequential behaviors through imitation (Grossberg and 
Paine, 2000). Conversation requires sustaining attention and the ability to flexibly disengage it. It 
requires delaying a motor response appropriately so that reciprocal communication may occur. It 
requires recognition of representations of social value. All of these steps are impaired within the 
iSTART model herein described. 
In comparison, other processing streams may be relatively less affected by dysfunctional 
adaptive timing, and they may develop with normal or even enhanced levels of function, due to 
a lack of competition during developmental critical and sensitive periods, or even by benefiting 
from hypervigilant processing. Thus autistic development is distorted rather than delayed. 
Multiple lesions within the cognitive-emotional-timing circuit that is summarized above may 
combine to result in symptoms of autism. The model suggests how several different 
combinations of deficits can all contribute to a full set of symptoms. Given the combination of 
cytoarchitectural, embryologic, and genetic data that was summarized above, it seems reasonable 
to hypothesize that multiple "hits" may occur in different portions of the brain for autism to fully 
manifest itself. 
The model raises several questions that do not seem to be clarified by available experimental 
evidence. In particular, can unclerarousecl emotional depression and hypervigilant cognitive 
learning both be directly caused by a similar underlying defect? This is a reasonable question to 
ask, because both unclerarousecl depression and hypervigilant learning are problems clue to 
incorrectly calibrated gains: in the former case, the gain of the excitatory signals that arouse the 
drive representation; in the latter case, the gain of the excitatory signals that try to activate the 
orienting system. Or can one defect cause the other, as in the case where uncleraroused 
depression can weaken adaptive timing, which can lead to spurious "hypervigilant" resets of 
attention and learning even if the vigilance parameter is chosen in the normal range? Or are they 
both indirect consequences of a failure within the hippocampal and/or cerebellar adaptive timing 
circuits themselves? Whichever routes may be there at the outset, the above discussion clarifies 
how they may perpetuate themselves via a system-wide vicious cycle. 
Comparison with Other Theories of Autism 
The iSTART model provides a more precise analysis of how breakdowns of brain mechanisms 
can lead to autistic symptoms than other proposed models of autism. It is, in fact, compatible 
with many of them, but differs from them in that it explains how each of their hypotheses may be 
manifestations of a dysfunctional network, rather than prime causes. 
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One alternative model (Howard et al., 2000) supposes autism to be secondary to an amygdala 
deficit. This hypothesis is based on studies showing that the amygdala of autistics fails to 
activate in normal ways to a variety of social stimuli such as faces, and some similarities in the 
neuropsychological profiles of high functioning autistics and patients with amygdala damage. 
The iSTART model is compatible with the amygdala hypothesis because it considers a 
depressed, notably underaroused depressed, drive representation within a region like the 
amygdala to be a critical network feature. The iSTART model also notes, however, that autistic 
symptoms may arise even if the prime lesion is not in the amygdala, since amygdala depression 
can also result from imbalances elsewhere in the brain. 
A similar comment can be made about the executive dysfunction hypothesis (Hughs et al., 
1996). Here again, the iSTART model includes executive dysfunction as a result r4 
underaroused depression. While hypofrontality could also cause depression in drive circuits, due 
to their reciprocal connections, there does not seem to be experimental evidence for the prime 
lesion of autism as occurring in the frontal lobes. Executive dysfunction is also not the earliest 
manifestation of the condition. A study of preschoolers with autism found no group differences 
between autistics and normal controls on eight executive function tasks, but did find that autistic 
children initiated fewer joint attention and social interaction behaviors (Griffen et al., 1999). 
This result has been confirmed in a larger study, comparing children with autistic spectrum 
disorder, children with developmental delay, and normal children, matched for mental age, on 
both dorsolateral and ventromedial prefrontal tasks (Dawson et al., 2002). Children with autistic 
spectrum disorders performed comparably to both comparison groups on all executive function 
tasks. 
Another group of related hypotheses are the "weak central coherence" model (Happe, 1996), and 
the "deficient hierarchization" model (Motu·on et al., 1999). While differing in subtle ways, both 
of these hypotheses focus on deficiencies in binding perceptual inputs into higher-order 
representations. Neither of these models explain all key autistic features, or attempt to fit with 
known neuropathologic data. The iSTART model proposes an ART -based learning mechanism 
whereby this processing deficiency can occur and places it in context wherein many data about 
normal learning and binding can be explained. 
Gustafsson has described autism as deficient self-organization of feature maps (Gustafsson, 
1997). This characteristic is created within the model presented in this paper by the state of 
hypervigilant ART-based learning. Indeed, ART models contain feature maps as part of their 
dynamics, notably the bottom-up flow of information in Figure 6. Gustafsson speculated that 
excessive lateral inhibition, as a primary deficit, may prevent adequate feature maps from 
forming. This concept is not incompatible with the model presented. On the other hand, it is not 
needed to explain the data if the other mechanisms discussed herein are at work. 
Courchesne and Allen have proposed that the parietal lobe and the cerebellum are both involved 
in the pathophysiology of autism with cerebellar modulation of the use of attentional resources 
(Allen and Courchesne, 2001). The iSTART model is compatible with this proposal, but also 
points to a series of interacting mechanisms that give rise to autistic symptoms that go beyond 
the Courchesne proposal. 
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Andreason and coworkers (Andreason et al., 1999) have not put forth a model for autism, but 
their model of schizophrenia has some overlap with the systems presented here. They proposed 
dysfunction in a co1ticocerebellothalamocortical loop in their attempt to explain certain findings 
in schizophrenia, which they characterize as a "cognitive dysmetria". In addition to lesion studies 
and functional imaging studies, they support the contention of a significant role for the 
cerebellum in cognition on several additional grounds: the volume of the cerebellum and the 
prefrontal cortex both are one third greater in humans than in non-human primates; the 
cerebellum also has extensive and reciprocal interconnections with a variety of neocortical 
regions, including the prefrontal cortex and limbic circuits. They define "cognitive dysmetria" as 
"a disruption of the interaction between cortical (especially frontal) functions such as initiation 
of memory retrieval or working memory and cerebellar functions such as timing and sequencing, 
leading to 'cognitive misconnections' and a disruption of the fluid coordination of mental 
activity." As in the iSTART model, the focus is not on any one anatomic locus of origin, but on 
the dysfunction of the circuit as a whole. As noted above, some of the mechanisms described 
here have also been used to analyse negative symptoms of schizophrenia (Grossberg, 1984, 
2000b), with an emphasis on the possibility that some schizophrenics are overaroused, rather 
than underaroused, depressives. However, the particular role of adaptive timing by cerebellum 
and hippocampus was not needed to qualitatively explain various schizophrenic negative 
symptoms. 
Conclusion 
The Imbalanced START model proposes how particular types of imbalanced mechanisms in 
different parts of the brain can generate autistic symptoms through brain-wide interactions. 
Although the model hereby provides a crucial linking hypothesis between brain mechanisms and 
behavioral symptoms, it is not without its limitations. In its present form, the model can show 
how various combinations of imbalanced interactions between cognitive, emotional, and timing 
systems can lead to autistic symptoms, but it cannot explain their underlying genetic or 
biochemical causes. However, by clarifying links between underlying brain mechanisms and 
behavioral outcomes, the iSTART model may help future research to focus more directly on 
characterizing the types of mechanisms that can lead to these behavioral outcomes. 
As various authors have proposed (Deuel, 2002), it may be most accurate to think of autism, not 
as a single disease, but as a common phenotype, characterized and explainable by an early-onset 
dysfunction of a circuit that involves cerebellar adaptive timing, the limbic system, and 
neocortical systems. Understanding the means by which genotypes produce these phenotypic 
products will be complex, if only because the genes that are known to be associated with autism 
do not express exclusively in any isolated part of the brain, nor in just the brain alone. For 
example, many genes that operate in hindbrain development also control gut development 
(Allman, 2000). Autistics may consequently have abnormal absorption of various substances 
which may affect brain function. The possibility exists that multiple environmental or infectious 
triggers might influence the timing and/or severity of autistic symptoms. Despite these 
limitations, the iSTART model proposes a new framework whereby research at multiple levels 
may be integrated without losing sight of how all of these levels contribute to the behavioral 
symptoms that characterize the lives of autistics. 
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